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Abstract 
This paper explores changes in Industrial Relations (IR) regulation and practice in a 
context of institutional crisis and change. The existing literature on industrial relations 
in Greece highlights a long process of deregulation that has been accelerated since the 
onset of the economic crisis, and the inherent segmentation of the Greek system 
between regulated players and largely unregulated informal and SME players.  
Radical neo-liberal reforms have weakened the position of those most reliant on 
traditional regulatory arrangements: larger formal sector employers and their workers, 
making the basis of Greek competitiveness more fragile. At the same time, the system 
cannot be dismissed as simply dysfunctional: key elite interests have done well from 
weak and uneven institutional coverage and have much to gain by reduced 
government capabilities. At the time of writing, the Greek IR system is being 
impelled in one direction by external pressures and elite interests, and another by a 
grassroots counter-movement; whilst the solutions to the Greek condition may be 
political, the realm of political action is circumscribed by long historical legacies.  
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Introduction 
There has been a growing body of work on IR in Greece, which has highlighted the 
nature and extent of structural crisis and systemic liberalization (Kornelakis and 
Voskeristian, 2014; Zambarloukou, 2010). A common strand running through such 
work is that Greece has undergone shifts towards lighted regulation, but without the 
complementarities normally associated with mature Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs,ibid.). In contrast, based on the most recent developments in Greece, and 
ongoing advances in the theoretical literature on comparative capitalism, we highlight 
not only institutional changes, but also long continuities, continuities that set Greece 
apart from both ‘disorganized’ LMEs and other Mixed Market Economies (MMEs), 
making for an industrial relations system with some quite distinct features.  
 
It can be argued that in examining issues of institutional change and labour market 
regulation, there has been a tendency to either neglect politics, or assume that the 
hollowing out of politics is a foregone conclusion, making liberalization inevitable 
(c.f. Streeck, 2011); in contrast, the accession to power of Syriza would indicate that 
political counter-movements may indeed make real advances, even if durable 
compromises or solutions remain elusive. Once more, as recent advances in elite 
theory alert us, when military elites are able to secure a persistent influence in 
national life, socio-economic realities will differ from other countries with broadly 
similar institutional arrangements in other respects (Priestland, 2012). Hence, this 
paper highlights the limitations of conceptualizations of the role of the state that 
simply depict it as retreating or struggling to manage markets; it draws out the 
consequences of excessive and partially concealed defence spending for other areas of 
the economy, and, by extension, for work and employment relations. This is a feature 
that sets Greece apart from MMEs, but has relevance for other national contexts 
where military ambitions outstrip economic capabilities, and where relations with the 
military have been quite effective in accessing resources, austerity elsewhere 
notwithstanding. In other words, unlike other MMEs, in Greece the sovereign debt 
crisis was not only due to the state shouldering the debts run up by an irresponsible 
banking sector, but owing to over-borrowing to support unsustainable levels of 
defence spending. Not only is the latter likely to crowd out investment in other areas 
of the economy (Scott, 2001; Kollias and Paleologou, 2010), but it also made the 
crisis, and the scale and depth of current reforms, particularly severe. Again, due to 
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long historical legacies, key economic elites have only selectively engaged with the 
national system (Close, 2014). Due to the extreme fluidity of the situation being faced 
in Greece at this time and the particularly ‘quick’ outdating of information, this 
research focuses on publically available information, complemented by recent 
theoretical advances within the broad literature on comparative capitalism and elite 
theory.  
 
Varieties of Capitalism and the Greek ‘Mixed Market’ Capitalism 
The original Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001) divides 
developed countries into Liberal (LME, e.g. US and UK) and Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME, e.g. Scandinavia, Germany, Japan). Hall and Soskice (2001) held 
that other capitalist archetypes lacked the known complementarities encountered in 
them, and hence would ultimately converge in the direction of one or the other. Later 
work conceded that convergence was neither a smooth nor inevitable process and that 
other societies had distinct and persistent institutional features (and, indeed, pockets 
of advantage) in their own right (Amable, 2003; Hancké et al., 2007). 
 
More recent developments and extensions of the VoC approach developed further 
archetypes. Hall and Thelen (2006) suggest that the economies found in Southern 
Europe, constitute an archetype in their own right, the “mixed market economies” 
(MMEs), which include Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. These economies show a 
“mixed market regulation with a degree of coordinated, relational arrangements” 
(Nash, 2011: 230). In other words, they have been classified as being in-between two 
mature archetypes of the VoC model (Hancké et al., 2007). The term MME is not an 
unproblematic one in that CMEs also combine elements of state and market.  
Nonetheless, this is a term that has gained some currency, and hence is one deployed 
through this article.  
 
In a recent Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations paper, Kornelakis and 
Voskeritsan (2014: 344) argued that reforms would “transform Greece into a 
dysfunctional market economy.” The political backlash against the reforms, and the 
accession to power of Syriza in 2015, have highlighted the extent to which top-down 
reforms may be halted or even reversed, and the essential dynamism and volatility of 
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the Greek system jeopardized. At the same time, Kornelakis and Voskeritsan (2014) 
focused on the formal mechanisms of regulation and policy reforms up until 2011; 
they acknowledge, however, that a key feature of Greece is not so much the 
regulatory reforms, but how there can be a persistent disarticulation between 
regulatory features and actual firm level practices. This would suggest that formal 
regulatory reforms may, in reality, have a very uneven impact on actual firm 
behaviour, especially SMEs and underground economies. Hence, a primary focus of 
this article is on the inherent and persistent segmentation of the Greek economy—and 
on changes since 2011 up until the acceptance of the third bailout terms following the 
2015 referendum—complementing this earlier detailed study of changes of regulatory 
features. 
 
MMEs are characterized by a large agricultural sector, long history of state 
intervention and relatively deregulated IR (c.f. Hall and Soskice, 2001: 21). In 
addition, MMEs are not based on skill intensity but rather on their ability to meet 
changes in market demands (Amable, 2003). As in other Mediterranean countries, 
Greece relies heavily on regulation (Casey, 2009) and the state plays a 
predominant role in various aspects of the national economic development such as 
the relationships between firms, the relationships between firms and financial 
capital and the determination of industrial relations outcomes, education, etc. 
(Schmidt, 2002; Zambarloukou, 2006; Fotopoulou, 2014). According to 
Zambarloukou (2010), another feature of Greece is the inefficient coordination 
within the economy and labour market which is mainly related to the large number 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Similarly with other MMEs, like 
Spain and Italy, Greece appears to have a misfit between labour institutions and 
lack of institutional complementarities (c.f. Molina and Rhodes, 2007: 225-226). In 
other words, in MMEs, there is a history of the state playing an extensive 
regulatory role; there is also a lack of developed institutional complementarities, 
especially in relation to welfare and educational provisions (Hancké et al., 2007; 
Amable, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The limited welfare provision increases 
the need for attachment to job security (Featherstone, 2008). In MMEs, a 
unionized employee voice is strongly reliant upon the provisions of a legislative 
framework (see Regalia, 1995; c.f. Marginson and Sisson, 2006). Hence “[…] 
legal enactment has been prior and collective bargaining secondary, reflecting the 
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pervasive role of the state in economic and social affairs […]” (Marginson and 
Sisson, 2006: 43). 
 
Whilst the MME categorization is a very broad one, there is little doubt that the Greek 
economy has all these features, albeit sometimes in an exaggerated form (c.f. 
Psychogios et al., 2010; Psychogios and Wood, 2010). This has led some writers to 
suggest that it is somewhat hard to categorize economies such as Greece that appear 
to be shifting towards a “defamiliarized” and more liberal model (Kornelakis and 
Voskeritsan, 2014). This argument is also supported by recent work in the 
comparative institutional tradition that has highlighted the extent to which institutions 
are not always as closely coupled as commonly presumed (Lane and Wood, 2009) nor 
is the coverage of national institutions necessarily complete (ibid.). In this respect, 
within any national context, there are areas of economic activity and social groupings 
that may become decoupled from dominant ways of doing things nationally. There are 
two forms of such decoupling which may be assumed. 
 
The first is that whilst there is an inevitable clustering of institutions at the national 
level, regional and sectoral institutions may make for alternative sets of 
complementarities (ibid.). A cluster of firms—or even, a single large firm—may 
create alternative sets of local institutions (Crouch et al., 2009: 672). Firms may opt 
away from the dominant national paradigm, orientating themselves towards regional 
or sectoral specific structures (ibid.). Such a process may be aimed at either 
compensating for national systemic “pathologies” or an attempt to build on regional 
strengths (Sorge, 2005: 245). 
 
A second process is institutional drift, whereby regions or social groupings become 
partially decoupled not so much as a conscious remedy for institutional failings at the 
national level, but because dominant interests gradually marginalize or discard those 
interests and groupings that are seen irrelevant to their own accumulation (Jessop, 
2012). In turn, players may seek to at least partially exit from the system because the 
burdens imposed (i.e., the taxes or formal employment regulation) appear greater than 
the benefits of participation.  
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From a social system of production starting point, Amable (2003) argues that what he 
terms as the Mediterranean model is neither temporary nor transitional, but may 
persist and evolve on distinct lines. Such countries have some advantages in labour 
intensive industries sensitive to wage costs, such as textiles and rubber products 
(Amable, 2003: 205; c.f. Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou 2013); whilst many emerging 
markets may have even lower costs, they lack the market access Mediterranean enjoy 
as members of the EU. Whilst the hands-off employment policies, and low investment 
in vocational training, that characterize them is rather akin to LMEs (Amable, 2003: 
140), in Mediterranean economies, this is combined with more regulated product 
markets, a tradition of higher levels of state command and control regulation, and 
with their associated administrative and regulatory burdens (Amable 2003: 120). 
 
Schmidt (2002) provides an alternative—but broadly similar typology—that of ‘State-
influenced Market Economies’ (Schmidt, 2007), which, devotes more attention to 
industrial relations issues. In State-influenced Market Economies, inter-firm and 
employment relationships are characterized by high levels of state mediation, but also 
adversarialism as was the case in Greece, at least until the onset of the 2008 crisis 
(Featherstone, 2008). Jessop (2012) argues that, whilst national specificities persist, at 
particular moments, a set of ideologies and practices may attain eco-systemic 
dominance; currently, this is neo-liberalism, and hence, any changes in the Greek 
system in response to crisis are likely to be in this direction.  
 
Featherstone (2011) argues that successive Greek governments had failed to deal with 
structural problems of competitiveness, and gross imbalances in both investment and 
trade, making the economy highly vulnerable to external shocks. The 2008 economic 
crisis resulted in the country being placed under an unprecedented degree of “external 
monitoring and policing” by the International Financial Institutions and the EU 
(Featherstone, 2011: 193) arguably on a more thorough level than other crisis-ridden 
EU states. In turn, the imposition of these measures raise questions of state legitimacy 
and governability which may have unforeseen future consequences (Featherstone, 
2011).  
 
 
Elite Composition and the Greek Crisis 
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Indeed, the scale of the crisis, which was even worse than those suffered by Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland might suggest that Greece is a rather extreme case. On the one 
hand, it could be argued that Greece’s large underground economy and institutional 
complexities suggest that it has more in common with the transitional economies of 
the Balkan countries than more developed Mediterranean economies (Antonopoulos, 
2008; Psychogios and Szamosi, 2007). On the other hand, Greece is distinct from 
both other MMEs and the other Balkan states by the structural nature of its crisis. One 
of the most remarkable aspects of the present condition has been the haste with which 
the blame for banking sector misconduct has been glibly shifted onto the state: crises 
which, in Ireland, Spain and Italy, started in the banking sector have been swiftly and 
carelessly labelled as sovereign wealth crises, despite the fact that the latter were 
commonly caused by hasty bank bailouts. In contrast, and uniquely, the Greek crisis 
is, to a large extent, a genuine sovereign wealth one.  
 
As Dunne et al. (2001) note, for many years, owing to antipathy to Turkey, Greece 
has borne extraordinarily high levels of defence spending; easy credit was extended 
by West European banks at the prompting of their governments in order to bolster 
their domestic arms industries. Such spending was very much higher as a proportion 
of GDP than other NATO and EU states; at the end of the Cold War, most countries 
cut back on arms spending, but in the case of Greece it actually increased leading, in 
turn, to extremely high levels of government debt (Kollias et al., 2004). According to 
World Bank (2014) data, prior to 2008 Greece was spending 2.7% of GDP on military 
spending which increased to 3.0% and 3.2% in 2008-2009 respectively; in 2012 and 
2013 these were 2.4% and 2.5% respectively. In contrast, Italy and Spain have 
maintained 2% and 1% respectively for the last 10 years while Italy has dropped from 
1.8% to about 1.5% of GDP. 
 
As Lynn (2010: 118) notes, a large amount of such debt was “systematically 
concealed in the interests of national security”; this ‘fiddle’ meant that Greece’s debt 
situation was very much worse than initially anticipated, making for particularly 
painful adjustments. Moreover, an excessive investment on defence has crowded out 
investment in other areas, worsening structural distortions in the Greek economy, and, 
thus, indirectly contributed to the unbalanced nature of the labour market (c.f. Kollias 
and Paleologou, 2010). The partially concealed nature of defence spending has further 
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created ample opportunities for corruption, which may spill over into other areas of 
the economy; there is much evidence that high military spending worsens corruption 
(Gupta et al., 2001). Ironically, despite it having helped cause the Greek crisis, 
spending on the Greek military has not been curtailed to the same extent as other 
areas of the public sector (Drakoularakos, 2014); indeed, defence spending on 
equipment remains opaque (Dempsey, 2013), providing a fertile avenue for 
corruption, and degrading economic life at large. Priestland (2012) argues that elites 
are typically composed of three factions: militarists; merchant/capitalists; and savants. 
Only when the former two are discredited do the latter attain predominance, and enact 
policies that entail genuine social compromises. Whilst there is little doubt that 
capitalist elites and the solutions they have promulgated are now largely discredited 
with a large component of the Greek electorate, the militarists retain considerable 
political influence and clout, whilst weaker governmental regulatory capabilities 
make it harder to reign in less responsible economic interests. 
 
The Role of Enterprises in the Greek IR System 
In common with other MMEs, there is a pronounced dualism of labour markets and 
welfare institutions (Zambarloukou, 2010), where a large number of Small & Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs)1 exist (i.e., in the Greek case nearly two-thirds of total 
employment (c.f. Mulhern, 1995 and Kritsantonis, 1998). Most firms are family 
owned and managed by their founders or by small proprietors (Galanaki and 
Papalexandris, 2005; Mihail and Elefterie, 2006; Vouzas, 2004) and the ownership 
structure allows for the concentration of power and control within a few large holders 
(Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009). According to Amable (2003), in contrast with the 
Continental European model which emphasizes social protection, the Mediterranean 
model is based on employment protection. Nevertheless, employment protection 
legislation is in formal terms one of the strictest across the OECD countries (OECD 
2007, 2008 and 2009; c.f. Kretsos, 2011a: 458 and 2011b: 265), enforcement is 
generally inconsistent, incoherent and ineffective (Mihail, 2003; Psychogios et al., 
2010; Psychogios and Wood, 2010; Zambarloukou, 2007 and 2010). Indeed, the 
violation of labour law is considered an ‘endemic phenomenon’ for the majority of 
                                                 
1
 This study follows the definition of SMEs adopted by the European Commission (2003/361/EC). In 
particular, it distinguishes Medium-sized companies (<250 Employees and 50m Turnover), Small 
companies (<50 Employees and 10m Turnover) and Micro companies (<10 Employees and 2m 
Turnover). 
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enterprises in the private services sector (Kretsos, 2004; c.f. Kretsos, 2011b: 276). 
Where unions are absent, rights are particularly weak (Zambarloukou, 2007 and 2010) 
and in particular for SMEs (Mihail, 2004: 550). In any event, firms with less than 20 
employees (97% of Greek firms) are not obliged to recognize unions representative of 
their workforce (Kouzis, 2007; Kretsos, 2011b; Matsaganis, 2007). Indeed, it has 
been argued that worker rights are more precarious in Greece than in other MMEs 
(Mihail, 2003; c.f. Psychogios and Wood, 2010). 
 
It is widely noted that many Greek SMEs hire and pay employees in the form of 
undeclared work (Kretsos, 2004; Kouzis, 2009), evade taxation (Kapsalis, 2007; 
Kouzis, 2007; Psychogios and Wood, 2010), and generally ignore labour law 
legislations (Mihail, 2004), even if they are formally constituted enterprises. In 
contrast, large enterprises are highly regulated, and heavily unionized and since the 
onset of the crisis, many have engaged in large-scale job shedding (Hyman, 2010). 
After the agreement to the last bailout, the present Greek left government 
“committed” to 50€ billion in the sale or winding down of state owned assets (The 
Guardian, 2015; Reuters, 2015). This means that the more regulated component of 
the Greek economy (bar the military complex and allied firms) is likely to shrink with 
the unregulated component assuming greater importance. 
 
Towards the Liberalization of Industrial Relations 
Labour Market Deregulation 
In 2010 in collaboration with the European Union (EU), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) signed the Memorandum of Economic and Fiscal Policies (MoF-Law 
3845/2010a,b), starting a process of labour market deregulation, since the structure of 
the Greek labour market was the major barrier for growth of the Greek economy 
(Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012). In this respect, the target was a drastic reduction of 
labour costs and deregulation and liberalization. Various significant aspects of Greek 
labour law have been revised with major consequences both for the role of the state 
and the actors of the IR system (Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012). The labour law 
reform has been designed to address both the results of the international financial 
crisis and Greece’s own fiscal problems. In addition, the austerity measures of 
previous Greek governments, as imposed by the IMF and EU, have instituted 
significant and dramatic changes in employment policy. More specifically,  
 RI/IR  
10 
“[…]the measures proclaimed by the initial and consequent bailout agreements 
stipulated among others wage cuts, pay freezes, massive dismissals in the public 
sector, restructuring of public enterprises, lower minimum wages for young 
workers and increase in retirement age […]” Kretsos (2011b: 268).  
 
The new employment relations challenge the coverage of existing collective 
agreements. The reforms seek to promote the decentralization of collective bargaining 
(Kretsos, 2011b: 268). Collective agreements were substituted with individual or 
firm-specific contracts (Law 4024/2012). At the same time, the structural program 
adopted in February 2012 (Law 4046/2012) replaced the possibility of indefinite 
collective agreements between 1 and 3 years (Dedoussopoulos et al., 2013). 
Moreover, the law on redundancies became less strict by lowering the level of 
severance pay and by giving the opportunity to employers to give half of the 
severance pay to employees so long as they provided a written warning a few months 
earlier (ranging from two to six months depending on the number of working years 
with the current employer). The minimum wage experienced a 22% cut for employees 
over 25 years of age and 32% for those under 25 (Matsaganis, 2012). Finally, there 
was a suspension of bonuses from public sector employees and wage freezes 
(European Commission, 2015). These reforms mostly affected those with “good” jobs 
at larger organizations: non-unionized employees are not practically covered by any 
sort of union-based collective agreement (Kokkaliari, 2010a; Kretsos, 2011b). 
 
Working Conditions 
The employment laws (e.g., 3845/2010, 3863/2010, 4039/2012 and 4152/2012) also 
changed the regulation of working time, moving away from the standard level of eight 
hours hitherto promoted. Additional remuneration rates for overtime have also been 
cut. The working week has been extended from five to six days for private and public 
workers, without an additional wage increase, job cuts seem to have also led to work 
intensification with longer hours in many services for remaining public sector 
employees while overtime rates have been reduced (European Commission, 2015). It 
is a widespread view amongst trade union officials that the new legislative context 
allows “the employers to unilaterally define and adjust the number of working hours” 
(Kokkaliari, 2010a: 34). It also became easier for employers to make use of temporary 
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or part-time workers, whilst the provisional period of a probationary employment was 
extended. 
 
The Changing Role of Mediation and Arbitration  
One of the most critical and challenging issues is the future role of the OMED. As has 
been noted in the past, it played a significant role in advancing worker rights. Its 
reputation as being ‘worker friendly’ has been diluted under the new law (i.e., 
3899/2010). The latter significantly reduces the scope of the arbitration procedure at 
the expense of employees, whilst Law 4093/2012 makes the whole procedure simpler 
and faster for the benefit of the employer. In particular, only issues related to salaries 
and remuneration per hour can now be included within the remit of the arbitration 
process, whereas other terms and conditions (e.g., bonuses, compensation rates, and 
other benefits) that were typically part of this process are now excluded (INE/GSEE-
ADEDY, 2010: 299-300). 
 
Collective Redundancies and Job Losses 
New employment legislation allows greater flexibility in favour of the employers with 
regard to redundancies and compensation rates by changing the rules of collective 
dismissals (c.f. Kretsos, 2011b). More specifically, the compensation rate has been 
reduced up to 50% as soon as the employer gives advanced notice. Henceforth, 
according to the recent labour law reform, the period of notice is: a- one month for 
those that are employed from 2 months to 10 years; b- two months for those that are 
employed at least 10 years; c- three months for those that are employed at least 15 
years; d- four months for those that are employed at least 20 years; and e- six months 
for those that are employed more than 20 years (Kokkaliari, 2010b: 4). In addition, 
according to the new employment law, organizations with at least 150 employees can 
dismiss up to 5% of the workforce and no more than 30 employees, whereas before 
the enactment of the legislation the corresponding quota was 2% (maximum limit) 
(Kokkaliari, 2010b).  
 
Rethinking Greek Capitalism 
Greece currently is moving between two major groups of institutional drivers through 
which its capitalistic system can be understood. The first group is related to the 
traditional institutional logics of the system, namely the underground economy 
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(Katsios, 2006); the predominance of SMEs (Mulhern, 1995;Kritsantonis, 1998; 
Psychogios and Wood, 2010) that mainly operate on a national rather than 
international level (Kornelakis and Voskeristian, 2014); the adoption of informal 
management and organizational practices (Psychogios and Szamosi, 2007), and the 
poor capabilities of the state (Psychogios et al., 2008). The second group is related to 
the imposed institutional changes, attempting to respond to the crisis and make the 
system more liberalized (Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou, 2013; Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 
2012). These two seem to have created a context of institutional complexity that can 
decouple action from structure in terms of adopting more liberalized IR practices. For 
example, changes in the IR system have been targeted at liberalizing Greek 
capitalism. These changes can be understood in the following phases. 
 
In the initial phase (May 2010 to December 2010) of IR reform, changes in the 
individual labour law and the collective bargaining process were introduced. In the 
second (December 2010-October 2011), further legislation was introduced (Law 
3899/2010) that established the mediation and arbitration process of collective 
bargaining (Voskeritsian and Kornelakis 2011). From October 2011 to June 2012, 
collective bargaining had been further decentralized reaching the level of companies 
and industries (Law 4024/2011); this triggered more social and political resistance 
(European Commission, 2014). From June 2012 until December 2014 there was 
another change in the IR system. During this period, the second memorandum was 
ratified and more legislation emerged targeting to liberalize the IR system (Law 
4046/2012; 4152/2012). This phase was characterized by a stabilization of the system 
which the European Commission (2014) indicated that substantive implementation 
had occurred, goals were generally being met, and wages were in better alignment 
with productivity and costs; however, phase four came to a dramatic ‘halt’ with the 
January 2015 election of a left government and the introduction of dramatic 
turbulence back into the system (Financial Times, 2015) – termed Phase Five. It 
brought in legislation that sought to halt austerity (Bird, 2015). It can be argued that 
these waves of reforms had the consequences of weakening the position of those firms 
most closely engaged with formal institutional arrangements, leaving the large 
informal sector, the offshore activities of the “unpatriotic” capitalist elite (periodic 
promises of tax crackdowns notwithstanding) and the machinations of the militarists 
largely unscathed. The Greek system cannot, however, be dismissed as dysfunctional: 
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clearly, it continues to work quite well for certain economic interests, even if the 
reforms have left most workers worse off, and enhanced occupational and job 
insecurity.  
 
Although it has often been argued that neo-liberal interests welcome such periods of 
“creative destruction” in that they open the opportunity for the permanent destruction 
of structures that might mediate markets and facilitate the capture of resources by a 
new entrepreneurial class (invariably oligarchs) (Klein, 2007), such processes can, in 
some circumstances, leave existing elites completely discredited, and open 
opportunities for new political actors or movements. Whilst the latter are not 
invariably progressive, there is a growing number of examples (mostly in Latin 
America), where reckless liberalization has led to the ascendency of the radical left. 
At the time of writing, it is unclear whether the current Left Government will be able 
to realize its agenda, and, in any event, there seems little sign of a speedy resolution to 
Greece’s structural challenges. 
 
Hence, whilst it has widely been argued that all countries are to a lesser or greater 
extent liberalizing (Streeck, 2011), Greece is being pulled in two distinct directions, 
reflecting both the durable strength of key interest groupings who have little interest 
in better institutions and external pressures to liberalization on the one hand, and 
political counter-movements on the other hand. Although the military elite should 
bear a significant proportion of the blame for the Greek crisis, they continue to 
commandeer a disproportionate amount of state resources, whilst corruption 
surrounding defence spending does little to promote transparency elsewhere across 
the economy. Meanwhile, the capitalist elite are distinguished by their tendency to 
evade fiscal responsibility, again, a long legacy of a weak and at times, repressive, 
state tradition (Close, 2014); nowhere is this better evidenced than the Greek-owned 
merchant marine, one of the largest in the world, but largely flagged abroad in 
regulatory and tax havens. In turn, this makes it very difficult for even a progressive 
Greek government to promote social compromise, and to promote greater 
responsibility and engagement with the system among smaller economic 
players.Hence, liberalization has done little to erode systemic dualism, other than 
further weakening the position of those firms more closely engaged with, and who 
have built their competitiveness on, existing institutional arrangements.  
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But, how can the Greek system work better? Kornelakis and Voskeristian (2014) 
suggest that if the imposed institutional changes do not take account of the traditional 
institutional logics, they will fail: the whole effort of deregulating the IR system, 
intended to make the Greek business environment more attractive for foreign direct 
investments, will be of limited to no importance. In other words, there needs to be  
more thought as to what was the basis of competitiveness of those Greek and foreign 
firms that benefitted from existing institutional arrangements, and who provided 
“good” jobs for their workers, and how this can be preserved during a period of 
reform. Yet, it can be argued that a limitation of institutional theories is a tendency to 
focus on the gap between the present and the desirable, with only limited attention 
being accorded to how they may be bridged. Greece may be impelled in one direction 
by a progressive movement from below, but it is driven in another by external 
pressures, and, at home, by militarists and “unpatriotic” elites, who have little interest 
in stronger regulation, and who may well be served by weaker governmental 
capabilities. 
 
Conclusions 
In theoretical terms, this paper highlights the need to take account of the composition 
of elites in understanding both institutional path dependence and change, and the 
uneven and partial nature of what constitutes institutional functionality: systems that 
may appear in many respects dysfunctional may work rather well for specific 
economic interests. Indeed, it can be argued that institutional arrangements invariably 
incorporate some or other functionalities for particular sets of actors, or they would 
not emerge or persist at all. Although Greece has much in common with other MMEs, 
and indeed surrounding Balkan states, what sets Greece apart (with the possible 
exceptions of Serbia and Kosovo) is the disproportionate funnelling of state resources 
to the military, not only making for a genuine sovereign wealth crisis (as adverse to a 
bank inflicted one), but also less state spending in other areas, a crowding out of 
investment, as well as additional opportunities for corruption. In turn, this has 
reinforced the dualism in the economy. Whilst there has been a tendency to view 
states as retreating in the face of markets, in Greece the situation is more complicated. 
For example, Greek governments have persistently committed to excessive defence 
spending that has consistently outstripped resource capabilities, worsened by Western 
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European governments who encouraged their banks to extend easy credit to the Greek 
state to bolster up their arms exports. Although with the latest agreement this has been 
addressed somewhat (Wall Street Journal, 2015) it is still disproportionate. This is a 
further example of why the Greek case is a unique one that cannot be easily 
categorized as a ‘dysfunctional’ liberal market economy (Della Sala, 2008; 
Kornelakis and Voskeristian, 2014) or MME (Amable, 2003) that is characterized by 
an inevitable retreat from statism. 
 
There is little doubt that present Greek institutions are both weak and dysfunctional in 
terms of regulating labour markets, and, indeed, for securing viable and sustainable 
growth, even if they continue to work quite well in meeting the interests of both 
militarists and “unpatriotic” economic elite; indeed, reduced governmental 
capabilities make it inevitably more difficult to hold the latter to account. A long 
period of institutional drift caused by this type of capitalism, as local dominant elites 
battle to amend the system in order to cope with long term shifts in the capitalist 
economy, may result in such elites narrowing their focus on to their own immediate 
concerns which can easily be accommodated through liberalization of large areas of 
the economy, a process that Jessop (2011) argues is characteristic of the global neo-
liberal ecosystem. In short, smaller and more marginal players may both be pushed 
further out of the system (either through benign neglect or systematic exclusion) and 
actively choose to withdraw. This vests the organized labour and other civil society 
associations with great historic importance. In the absence of coherent policy 
alternatives, the role of trade unions is likely to remain defensive, mounting desperate 
rear-guard actions in order to shore up a decaying existing order. Whilst this vests 
national politics with great importance, it is as yet unclear if the current (2015) Greek 
government will be able to ameliorate external pressures and solve the problem of 
Greece’s elite.  
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